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THE VICTIMS OF NIMBY
Michael B. Gerrardt
I. Introduction
It is a syndrome, a pejorative, and an acronym of our times:
NIMBY, or Not In My Back Yard. It has a political arm,
NIMTOO (Not In My Term Of Office), an object of attack, LU-
LUs (Locally Undesired Land Uses), and an extreme form, BA-
NANA (Build Absolutely Nothing Anywhere Near Anyone).
Acronyms aside, however, the question remains as to whether or
not NIMBY has victims. Is anyone hurt by NIMBY?
Many leading voices in the environmental justice movement be-
lieve that minority communities are victims of NIMBY. For exam-
ple, Professor Robert D. Bullard has written that "[t]he cumulative
effect of not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) victories by environmen-
talists appears to have driven the unwanted facilities toward the
more vulnerable groups. Black neighborhoods are especially vul-
nerable to the penetration of unwanted land uses .... NIMBY,
like white racism, creates and perpetuates privileges for whites at
the expense of people of color."' This viewpoint has many adher-
t Michael B. Gerrard is a partner in the Manhattan law firm of Berle, Kass &
Case. He teaches environmental law as a member of the adjunct faculty of Columbia
Law School. B.A., Columbia, 1972; J.D., New York University, 1978. Kerry Rodgers
and Sara Smithken provided valuable research assistance.
1. ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMEN-
TAL QUALITY 46, 108 (1990); see also, Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Blackmail in
Minority Communities, in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS:
A TIME FOR DISCOURSE 82, 85 (Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai eds., 1992).
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ents,2 including the Environmental Equity Workgroup of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).3
In addition, some have argued that opposition to facilities, espe-
cially social service facilities, "compromise[s] the civic republican
account of community services as a public commitment shared by
all," 4 and "is a violation of the American right of life, liberty and
the pursuit of happiness and of religious and moral teachings that
each individual has worth and dignity. NIMBY divides our society
into acceptable and 'unacceptable' groups and threatens the social
unity essential to harmony and progress. ' '5
NIMBY, in its various forms, has three principal types of targets.
The first is waste disposal facilities, primarily landfills and incinera-
tors.6 The second is low-income housing. The third is social service
facilities, group homes7 and shelters for individuals such as the
mentally ill, AIDS patients, and the homeless.8
2. See, e.g., Jon C. Dubin, From Junkyards to Gentrification: Explicating a Right
to Protective Zoning in Low-Income Communities of Color, 77 MINN. L. REV. 739,765
n.113 (1993) (quoting Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Environmental Racism: Review-
ing the Evidence, in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS, supra
note 1, at 163, 164); Anna K. Harding & George R. Holdren, Jr., Environmental Eq-
uity and the Environmental Professional, 27 ENVTL. Sci. & TECH. 1990, 1991 (1993);
Harvey L. White, Hazardous Waste Incineration and Minority Communities, in RACE
AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS, supra note 1, at 126, 134; Ed-
ward Patrick Boyle, Note, It's Not Easy Bein' Green: The Psychology of Racism, Envi-
ronmental Discrimination, and the Argument for Modernizing Equal Protection
Analysis, 46 VAND. L. REV. 937, 978-79 (1993); Rodolfo Mata, Note, Inequitable Sit-
ing of Undesirable Facilities and the Myth of Equal Protection, 13 B.C. THIRD WORLD
L.J. 233, 235 (1993).
3. See ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY WORKGROUP, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES 20-21
(1992) ("a result of the 'not in my backyard (NIMBY)' syndrome is that such facilities
will tend to be located in communities with the least ability to mount a protest").
4. Peter Margulies, Building Communities for Virtue: Political Theory, Land Use
Policy, and the 'Not in My Backyard' Syndrome, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 945, 947
(1992).
5. AMERICAN FRIENDS SERV. COMM., STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON INCLUSIVE
COMMUNITIES (1992).
6. Nuclear power plants were once subject to fierce local opposition, but there
have been no new orders for such plants in the United States since the Three Mile
Island accident in 1979. See Nicholas Lenssen & Christopher Flavin, Closing Out Nu-
clear Power, WORLD WATCH, Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 35.
7. Group homes are typically community-based living facilities offering a family-
like environment for between four and sixteen clients. Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Group
Homes, Shelters and Congregate Housing: Deinstitutionalization Policies and the
NIMBY Syndrome, 21 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 413, 418 (1986).
8. Public opinion polls show that these facilities are lumped together in the pub-
lic mind as highly undesirable neighbors. See Christopher J. Smith & Robert Q.
Hanham, Any Place But Here! Mental Health Facilities as Noxious Neighbors, 33
PROF. GEOGRAPHER 326 (1981). Fear is a major reason for this opposition-fear of
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This Article addresses the issue of the victims of NIMBY, with
special reference to the effects of project opposition on racial mi-
norities. Because the effect of facility opposition varies widely with
the type of project involved, Part II arrays the types of relevant
projects and shows the ways that opposition manifests itself. Part
III then briefly discusses the legal techniques used by those who
oppose facilities, and the counter measures used by facility propo-
nents. Part IV examines the available evidence on who suffers as a
result of the opponents' techniques. Part V looks at who benefits
from opposition to siting new facilities. Part VI is devoted to some
of the secondary and imponderable effects of facility opposition.
Finally, Part VII draws conclusions from the preceding discussion,
and shows how the costs and benefits of NIMBY are very different
from those envisioned by those who either condemn or applaud
facility opposition.
II. The Techniques and Law of NIMBY
A. Waste Disposal Facilities
There are about two dozen different kinds of major waste
streams requiring disposal facilities and each is subject to its own
regulatory schemes and siting processes.9 Despite this large
number, though, much of the public controversy over facility siting
has revolved around the following categories of waste streams.
cancer and other adverse health effects from waste disposal facilities, see Kent E.
Portney, SITING HAZARDOUS WASTE TREATMENT FACILITIES: THE NIMBY SYN-
DROME 89, 95, 134 (1991); James L. Regens, Siting Hazardous Waste Management
Facilities, in PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT AND SOCIAL IMPACr ASSESSMENT 121, 124-25
(Gregory A. Daneke et al. eds., 1983), fear of crime, see MARJORIE BEGGS,
ZELLERBACH FAMILY FUND, OK IN My BACKYARD: ISSUES AND RIGHTS IN HOUS-
ING FOR THE MENTALLY ILL 13 (1993); Davan Maharaj, Center Unwanted Neighbor to
Residents; Dispute: Garden Grove Homeowners Want Facility for Mentally Ill to Move,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1993, at Al, and even moral degeneration, see Michael Winerip,
NIMBY Views on People With AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1988, at B1, from the clients
of social service facilities and from the residents of low-income housing units. Con-
cern over the impact on property values has also been cited as an important factor.
See ADVISORY COMM'N ON REGULATORY BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING,
"NOT IN MY BACKYARD": REMOVING BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING 1-5 to 1-
7 (1991) [hereinafter ADVISORY COMM'N]; BEGGS, supra, at 12.
9. These kinds of waste streams, the way they are disposed and regulated, and
the way siting decisions are made are discussed in detail in chapters 2-4 of a forthcom-
ing book by the author. MICHAEL B. GERRARD, WHOSE BACKYARD, WHOSE RISK:
FEAR AND FAIRNESS IN TOXIC AND NUCLEAR WASTE SITING (M.I.T. Press, forthcom-
ing 1994) [hereinafter GERRARD, WHOSE BACKYARD, WHOSE RISK]. An abridged
version of this book can be found in Michael B. Gerrard, Fear and Loathing in the
Siting of Hazardous and Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities: A Comprehensive Solu-
tion to a Misperceived Crisis, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1047 (1994).
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1. Hazardous waste'°
Hazardous waste is generally disposed of either at the point of
generation, or at off-site facilities operated by private companies.
Most states have their own siting laws," although these laws are
subject to limited federal constraints.
2. Municipal Solid Waste
Municipal solid waste ("MSW") includes both household trash
and commercial refuse. Most MSW is deposited in landfills or in-
cinerated, although nowadays an increasing percentage is recycled.
Most landfills or incinerators are operated by or for municipalities
and are sited in accordance with state laws. Again, the state laws
are subject to minimum federal standards.' 2
3. Medical Waste
Generated primarily by hospitals and clinics, most medical waste
is burned in incinerators operated by the hospitals or by consortia
of hospitals. There are also commercial facilities dedicated to in-
cineration or autoclaving of medical waste.' 3
4. High Level Radioactive Waste
High level radioactive waste is generated by nuclear power
plants and by the production of nuclear weapons. The siting of
storage and disposal facilities is undertaken by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Energy, under the regulation of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission and the EPA, in accordance with the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act.' 4 This material remains hazardous for tens or hundreds
of thousands of years, and deep geologic disposal has become the
preferred method of disposal. 15
10. "Hazardous waste" is a defined term under the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6903(5), 6921 (1988).
11. NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE COMM'N ON Toxic SUBSTANCES & HAZARD-
OUS WASTES, HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITY SITING: A NATIONAL SURVEY (June
1987) [hereinafter HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITY SITING]; A. Dan Tarlock, Siting
New or Expanded Treatment, Storage, or Disposal Facilities: The Pigs in the Parlors of
the 1980s, 17 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 429 (1984).
12. William L. Kovacs, Solid Waste, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE
§ 35.01[2] (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 1992 & Supp. 1993).
13. AGENCY FOR Toxic SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, U.S. PUBLIC
HEALTH SERV., THE PUBLIC HEALTH IMPLICATIONS OF MEDICAL WASTE: A REPORT
TO CONGRESS (1990).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 10101 (1988).
15. LUTHER J. CARTER, NUCLEAR IMPERATIVES AND PUBLIC TRUST: DEALING
WITH RADIOACTIVE WASTE 33 (1987).
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5. Transuranic waste
Transuranic waste is principally plutonium, from nuclear weap-
ons production. As with high level radioactive waste, deep geo-
logic disposal is preferred.
6. Low-level radioactive waste
This is primarily from nuclear power plants, but a portion is also
from industrial, scientific, and medical uses. Federal law requires
the states to site their own facilities, either alone or in conjunction
with other states,' 6 but little progress has been made in creating
new facilities.
Every one of the above facilities requires a series of environmen-
tal permits from state and/or federal regulatory agencies. These
permits generally cannot be issued without public hearings and
other opportunities for citizen participation. Facility opponents
generally try to use theadministrative and judicial processes, which
are open to extensive citizen involvement, to prevent these permits
from being issued.
Additionally, formal site-selection processes that are normally
separate from the permitting processes have been established for
most of these kinds of facilities. The siting processes also usually
involve citizen participation.
Zoning restrictions are another method. However, several states
have preempted the ability of municipalities to use their zoning or
other powers to keep out unwanted facilities. 17 Except for high-
level and transuranic radioactive waste, there is only limited fed-
eral preemption of state siting processes for waste disposal
facilities.' 8
B. Low-income housing
Unlike waste disposal facilities, new housing units typically do
not require environmental permits, other than conventional water
and sewer approvals, unless the sites are in protected areas such as
wetlands or the habitat of endangered species. Local opposition to
low-income housing often focuses on efforts to pressure local gov-
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021d.
17. Neil R. Shortlidge & S. Mark White, The Use of Zoning and Other Local Con-
trols for Siting Solid and Hazardous Waste Facilities, 7 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 3
(1993).
18. Patrick O'Hara, Note, The N.I.M.B.Y. Syndrome Meets the Preemption Doc-
trine: Federal Preemption of State and Local Restrictions on the Siting of Hazardous
Waste Disposal Facilities, 53 LA. L. REV. 229 (1992).
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ernments to use their zoning and land use powers to exclude such
units. In accommodation of such pressure, many municipalities
have adopted a variety of techniques: requirements for large build-
ing lots; restrictions on the ability to subdivide property into
smaller lots; restrictions on new hookups to sewers, drinking water
lines, and other utilities; exactions (such as fees to reimburse the
municipality for the development's impacts on parks, schools, or
other public facilities); expensive construction and design stan-
dards; construction moratoria; and zoning that prohibits multi-fam-
ily dwellings.19 Hundreds of local governments in every region of
the country have adopted some form of growth rest rictions.2 °
The Fair Housing Act21 and the Civil Rights Act 22 prohibit racial
discrimination in the sale and rental of housing, and in zoning.23
All states and localities receiving federal housing assistance are re-
quired by law to submit to the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) a Comprehensive Housing Af-
fordability Strategy statement that includes a description of the
community's efforts to remove or ameliorate the negative effects of
regulatory barriers. However, there is no enforcement mechanism
to require the lifting of such barriers.24 Some state courts have de-
clared that each municipality has a responsibility to build afforda-
ble housing for a portion of the region's low-income residents,
though the enforcement mechanisms for these requirements vary
widely.25
C. Social service facilities
Group homes and other similar facilities are often unpopular
with their immediate neighbors. This is especially so where the cli-
entele are people the neighbors find threatening, such as drug ad-
19. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 8, at 4, 6.
20. Jane H. Lillydahl & Larry D. Singell, The Effects of Growth Management on
the Housing Market: A Review of the Theoretical and Empirical Evidence, 9 J. URB.
AFF. 63, 64 (1987).
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3617 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988).
23. See Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2d
Cir.) (action brought against town for refusing to amend ordinance restricting private
multi-family housing projects), aff'd, 488 U.S. 15 (1988).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 12705; see Michael H. Schill, The Federal Role in Reducing Regula-
tory Barriers to Affordable Housing in the Suburbs, 8 J.L. & POL. 703, 707 (1992).
25. See Martha Lamar et al., Mount Laurel at Work: Affordable Housing in New
Jersey, 1983-1988, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 1197 (1989).
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dicts and ex-convicts.26 In order to prevent neighborhoods from
blocking these facilities, many states have enacted statutes pre-
empting local control over the facilities, and these statutes have
generally been upheld by the courts.27 Most courts have also been
unsympathetic to efforts to block these facilities through the use of
environmental impact statement laws 28 or (where health fears have
been found to be irrational) the public health laws.2 9 The United
States Supreme Court has also looked suspiciously at municipal ef-
forts to exclude group homes, and has subjected such efforts, when
motivated by neighborhood opposition, to heightened scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.30 The
U.S. Department of Justice has gone so far as to bring a lawsuit
under the Fair Housing Act against residents of an affluent neigh-
borhood who were fighting an effort to establish a group home in
their midst.31
In recent years organizations in several minority communities
have attempted to challenge the siting of different types of un-
wanted facilities on the grounds that the selection of sites in their
neighborhoods amounted to unlawful discrimination. These ef-
forts-whether aimed at waste disposal facilities 32 or at social ser-
26. Marc B. Golstein et al., Public Preferences and Site Location of Residential
Treatment Facilities, 17 J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 186 (1989).
27. Terry Rice, Group Homes Site Selection Arouses Opposition, N.Y. L.J., June
10, 1992, at S-1; Salsich, supra note 7, at 424-46. These statutes are comprehensively
reviewed in Lester D. Steinman, The Effect of Land- Use Restrictions on the Establish-
ment of Community Residences for the Disabled: A National Study, 19 URB. LAW. 1
(1987).
28. Ronald C. Slye, Environmental Review of Facilities for the Homeless in New
York, 3 ENVTL. L. N.Y. 178 (1992); Katherine Baird Russo, Note, Neighborhood
Character and SEQRA: Courts Struggle With Homeless Shelters, Prisons, and the En-
vironment, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 231 (1989).
29. Association of Relatives & Friends of AIDS Patients v. Regulations & Permits
Admin., 740 F. Supp. 95 (D.P.R. 1990); Baxter v. City of Belleville, 720 F. Supp. 720
(S.D. Il. 1989); see David Bernstein, From Pesthouses to AIDS Hospices: Neighbors'
Irrational Fears of Treatment Facilities and Contagious Diseases, 33 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 1 (1990).
30. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); see Harold A.
Ellis, Neighborhood Opposition and the Permissible Purposes of Zoning, 7 J. LAND
USE & ENVTL. L. 275 (1992); Daniel R. Mandelker, Housing Issues, in AIDS AND
THE LAW: A GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC (Harlon L. Dalton et al. eds., 1987).
31. Andrew L. Yarrow, 'Not in My Back Yard' and Repercussions: An Effort to
Keep a Woman and 10 Children Out Results in a Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1992, at
A42.
32. East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning &
Zoning Comm'n, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989); R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp.
1144 (E.D. Va. 1991), affd, 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992); Bean v. Southwestern Waste
Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979), affd, 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir.
1986).
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vice facilities 33-have been uniformly unsuccessful, primarily
because the Supreme Court requires proof of discriminatory intent
in such cases. 34
III. The Victims of NIMBY
A. Facility Users
1. Waste generators
It is frequently asserted that the nation has a severe shortage of
waste disposal facilities and that more are badly needed. To test
the validity of this claim, and therefore whether waste generators
are being hurt by opposition to new facilities, the next section will
examine each of the major waste streams listed above.
a. Hazardous waste
Ninety-six percent of the hazardous waste generated in the
United States is disposed of at the point of generation.35 The re-
maining four percent is sent to commercial facilities around the
country. Currently, the country has 103 chemical treatment plants,
95 solvent recovery plants, 60 physical treatment plants, 30 kilns
that burn hazardous waste as fuel, 24 landfills, 20 incinerators, and
8 deep injection wells. 36 Today, most siting controversy revolves
around efforts to expand the number of landfills and incinerators;
there has long been ample capacity at most other types of facili-
ties.37 In fact, during the 1980's at least four hazardous waste treat-
ment facilities received final permits but failed to open because of
insufficient markets. 38 In the early 1990's, various factors, particu-
larly the economic recession, successful waste minimization efforts,
and fear of liability for off-site disposal, combined to drive down
the demand for new landfills and incinerators, leading to the can-
33. Coalition of Bedford-Stuyvesant Block Ass'ns v. Cuomo, 651 F. Supp. 1202
(E.D.N.Y. 1987).
34. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
35. OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY. RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROTEC-
TION AGENCY, PUB. No. 05-312, NATIONAL BIENNIAL RCRA HAZARDOUS WASTE
REPORT, BASED ON 1989 DATA (Feb. 1993).
36. McCoy & Assocs., 1993 Outlook for Commercial Hazardous Waste Manage-
ment Facilities: A Nationwide Perspective, HAZARDOUS WASTE CONSULTANT (Mar./
Apr. 1993).
37. JAMES E. MCCARTHY & MARK E. ANTHONY REISCH, CONGRESSIONAL RE-
SEARCH SERVICE, HAZARDOUS WASTE FACT BOOK 31 (1987).
38. HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITY SITING, supra note 11, at 26.
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cellation of several expansion plans.39 Several trade publications
and industry analysts have concluded that the country has as many
hazardous waste landfills and incinerators as it needs.4
b. Municipal solid waste
Of the approximately 180 million tons of MSW generated annu-
ally, 72.7% is landfilled, 14.2% is incinerated, and 13.1% is re-
cycled or otherwise recovered.4 1 Although the number of MSW
landfills declined from about 20,000 in the early 1970's to about
7,000 in 1991,42 the new landfills that are opening are so large that
total capacity has actually increased,43 and a bidding war has
erupted among landfills looking for more garbage.44 There is also a
good deal of unused incinerator capacity nationwide, 45 and several
municipalities are losing a great deal of money on new-but under-
utilized-incinerators.46
39. See Hazardous Waste: Colorado Firm Abandons Application to Build Waste
Incinerator in Florida, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1174 (Oct. 22, 1993); Hazardous Waste:
Company Withdraws Application to Build Incinerator, Cites EPA Review of Permits,
24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 881 (Sept. 17, 1993); Hazardous Waste: Waste Company Blames
North Carolina After Abandoning Bid to Build Incinerator, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 909
(Sept. 24, 1993); Jeff Bailey, WMX Technologies Ends Plan to Build California Incin-
erator; Demand Shrinks, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 1993, at C15; Elisabeth Kirschner, Du-
Pont Drops Incineration, But Ecoservices Still Growing, CHEM. WEEK, Sept. 8, 1993,
at 9.
40. See ALEX BROWN & SONS, ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH: CHEMICAL WASTE
MANAGEMENT, INC., ROLLINS ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, INC. 17 (Apr. 5, 1993);
Jeff Bailey, WMX Slates Big Write-Down, Job Cuts as Hazardous-Waste Industry
Struggles, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 1993, at A3; Hazardous Waste Market Growth Fueled
by Remediation, Disposal & Services Flat, ENVTL. Bus. J., June 1993, at 1; Jeffrey D.
Smith, Growth Potential of the Hazardous Waste Landfill Business, El DIGEST, Apr.
1990, at 45.
41. SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE OFFICE, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, PUB. No. EPA/530-SW-90-042A, CHARACTERIZATION OF MUNICIPAL
SOLID WASTE IN THE UNITED STATES: 1990 UPDATE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ES-3,
ES-6 (1990).
42. NATIONAL SOLID WASTES MANAGEMENT ASS'N, LANDFILL CAPACITY IN
NORTH AMERICA-1991 UPDATE (1992).
43. Id. at 4; Jeff Bailey, Space Available: Economics of Trash Shift as Cities Learn
Dumps Aren't So Full, WALL ST. J., June 2, 1992, at 1; Edward W. Repa & Susan K.
Sheets, Landfill Capacity in North America, WASTE AGE, May 1992, at 18.
44. Barnaby J. Feder, The Saga of Lonetree Landfill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1992, at
D1.
45. E. Malone Steverson, Provoking a Firestorm: Waste Incineration, 25 ENVTL.
SCIENCE TECH. 1808 (1991).
46. See Frank E. Allen, Some Incinerators Have Capacity to Burn, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 2, 1991, at B1; Jeff Bailey, Up in Smoke: Fading Garbage Crisis Leaves Incinera-
tors Competing For Trash, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 1993, at Al; Jonathan Rabinowitz,
Costs of Long Island Incinerators Rise With Trash Shortage, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1992,
at 26.
1994] 503
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXI
c. Medical waste
Existing medical waste incinerators have the capacity to burn
about ten times the amount of the waste that is actually generated,
though most of the excess capacity is in hospital incinerators that
are only used intermittently. Efforts to build new medical waste
incinerators are aimed principally at achieving larger, more effi-
cient units with better pollution controls, rather than at remedying
any serious capacity shortage.47
d. High-level Radioactive Waste
The United States has no facilities for the permanent disposal or
long-term storage of high-level radioactive waste. The federal gov-
ernment is attempting to build a repository for this material at
Yucca Mountain, Nevada, but meanwhile most such waste is stored
at or near the installations where it is created.48 Most of the high-
level radioactive waste from nuclear weapons production is stored
in 177 underground tanks at the U.S. Department of Energy's
("DOE") Hanford Reservation in southern Washington State, and
fifty-one tanks at DOE's Savannah River plant in South Carolina.
Several of these tanks are leaking, and there is considerable fear
that they may burst from the chemical and radioactive reactions
that constantly occur within them. 9 Spent fuel rods from nuclear
power plants are generally kept in storage pools at the plants them-
selves, under conditions that are generally regarded as safe for the
next several decades, though operation of these pools is very
expensive.50
e. Transuranic Waste
The federal government has built the Waste Isolation Pilot Pro-
ject (WIPP) in an excavated salt cavern near Carlsbad, New Mex-
ico, to dispose of transuranic waste, but it is not yet open.
47. Steverson, supra note 45, at 1810-11; see also Jeff Bailey, How Two Garbage
Giants Fought Over Medical Waste, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 1992, at B6 (discussing the
overcapacity of medical waste incinerators in some markets).
48. GERALD JACOB, SITE UNSEEN: THE POLITICS OF SITING A NUCLEAR WASTE
REPOSITORY (1990).
49. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, PUB. No. OTA-0-484,
COMPLEX CLEANUP: THE ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRO-
DUCTION (1991); Matthew L. Wald, At an Old Atomic-Waste Site, The Only Sure
Thing is Peril, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1993, at Al.
50. BOARD ON RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
SCIENCE, RETHINKING HIGH LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL (July 1990).
504
VICTIMS OF NIMBY
Meanwhile, transuranic waste is in storage, mostly in a facility in
Idaho.51
f Low-Level Radioactive Waste (LLRW)
Virtually all of the nation's commercially produced LLRW is
currently landfilled at facilities in South Carolina and Washing-
ton.52 There has been little progress in siting new facilities, despite
noisy controversies in several states. States that have not reached
agreements with South Carolina or Washington are facing loss of
access to those facilities, requiring planning for storage of the
LLRW while new disposal facilities are sited and built.53
As this survey illustrates, there is no real shortage of non-radio-
active waste disposal facilities in this country. The generators of
hazardous waste, municipal solid waste, and medical waste can all
find available disposal facilities, though sometimes at a high
price. 4 The spent fuel from nuclear power plants is stored at the
plants and will be for many years until a centralized interim storage
facility or a long-term disposal facility is opened. Commercial dis-
posal capacity for low-level radioactive waste will soon be unavail-
able for most states, and interim storage will be necessary. The
varieties of radioactive waste from nuclear weapons production are
in storage around the country, often in crude and dangerous condi-
tions, but little of this waste is still being generated, except from
the cleanup of previously contaminated sites.
2. Residents of substandard and unaffordable homes
People who now live in substandard housing, people who do not
have a place of their own at all,55 and people who live in housing
that consumes such a large portion of their income that they must
51. CARTER, supra note 15, at 176; Keith Schneider, Wasting Away, N.Y. TIMES
MAO., Aug. 30, 1992, at 42.
52. Sarah Lyall, Failing to Build a Dump, New York Faces Shutout, N.Y. TIMES,
May 21, 1993, at Al; Robert Reinhold, States, Failing to Cooperate, Face a Nuclear-
Waste Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1992, at Al.
53. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO/RCED-92-61, NUCLEAR
WASTE: SLOW PROGRESS DEVELOPING Low-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL
FACILITIES (1992).
54. It is sometimes alleged that the unavailability or high price of waste disposal
leads to widespread illegal dumping. The available information, however, shows that
this allegation is without basis. See GERRARD, WHOSE BACKYARD, WHOSE RISK,
supra note 9, ch. 5.
55. A shortage of low-cost housing has been cited as a major reason for homeless-
ness. See Marta Elliott & Lauren J. Krivo, Structural Determinants of Homelessness
in the United States, 38 Soc. PROBLEMS 113 (1991).
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do without other necessities 56 are the potential beneficiaries of new
low-income housing units.
By several measures, the United States has a severe and growing
shortage of affordable housing. The 1980's saw more poor people
competing for less low-income housing.57 According to a report
from Harvard's Joint Center for Housing Studies, over three-
quarters of poor, unsubsidized tenants paid more than half of their
income for housing in 1990.58 One scholar wrote that in 1991
"[n]early 29 million households in the United States-containing
85 million people, or 34 percent of the population-face so great a
squeeze between inadequate incomes and high housing costs that
after paying for their housing they are unable to meet their non-
shelter needs at even a minimum level of adequacy. ' 59 Though a
numerical majority of these "shelter-poor" households are white,
the burden is borne disproportionately by minorities; about 25% of
white households, but 50% of African American and 50% of La-
tino households, are "shelter poor. ' 60 According to a 1988 survey
of twenty-seven cities by the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the aver-
age waiting time between filing an application for assisted housing
and receiving assistance is twenty-one months, and many cities
have stopped accepting applications altogether.61 A 1985 study
found there were 11.6 million households with incomes below
$10,000, but only 7.9 million rental units that these households
could afford (and many of those units were either uninhabitable, or
occupied by more affluent families).62
Even well above the poverty line, many families are adversely
affected. In the words of the Advisory Commission on Regulatory
Barriers to Affordable Housing, "Middle-income workers, such as
police officers, firefighters, teachers, and other vital workers, often
56. A standard rule of thumb is that housing is unaffordable if it consumes more
than 30% of household income, see ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 8, at 3; Schill,
supra note 24, at 705 n.7, although a large family has greater cash needs for food,
clothing and other necessities than a small one, and can therefore afford to spend less
of its income on housing. See MICHAEL E. STONE, SHELTER POVERTY: NEW IDEAS
ON HOUSING AFFORDABILITY 34-44 (1993).
57. James D. Wright & Beth A. Rubin, Is Homelessness a Housing Problem?, 2
Hous. POL'Y DEBATE 937, 951 (1991).
58. Schill, supra note 24, at 705 n.7.
59. STONE, supra note 56, at 32.
60. Id. at 33.
61. U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, A STATUS REPORT ON HUNGER AND HOME-
LESSNESS IN AMERICA'S CITIES: 1988; A 27-CITY SURVEY 63-64 (1989).
62. PAUL A. LEONARD ET AL., A PLACE TO CALL HOME: THE CRISIS IN HOUSING
FOR THE POOR 6-8 (1989).
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live many miles from the communities they serve, because they
cannot find affordable housing there."63
There are many ways that restrictions can increase the price and
reduce the supply of housing.64 For example, restrictions can in-
crease the price of an acre of land, allow fewer units per acre, limit
the number of units that can be built, create approval delays that
add to carrying costs; discourage new developers from entering the
market, thereby allowing existing developers to charge higher
prices; and induce developers to build for higher-income markets.65
Several attempts have been made to quantify how much local op-
position and exclusionary techniques add to the cost of new hous-
ing. Housing prices in communities that make aggressive attempts
to discourage the construction of affordable housing can be as
much as 50% higher than for comparable units in nearby commu-
nities that do not make such attempts,66 but more typically, the
margin is between 10 and 20%67 The magnitude of the difference
will depend on several variables, such as the demographic composi-
tion of the community, the nature of the controls imposed, the
growth controls of surrounding communities, and other factors af-
fecting supply and demand in the housing market in question.68
63. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 8, at 3.
64. IRA S. LOWRY & BRUCE W. FERGUSON, URBAN LAND INST., DEVELOPMENT
REGULATION AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY 153 (1992); Norman Karlin, Zoning and
Other Land Use Controls: From the Supply Side, 12 Sw. U. L. REV. 561 (1981).
65. See David E. Dowall, The Effect of Land Use and Environmental Regulations
on Housing Costs, 8 POL'Y STUD. J. 277 (1979); Bernard J. Frieden, The New Regula-
tion Comes to Suburbia, 55 PUB. INTEREST 15 (1979); Lawrence Katz & Kenneth T.
Rosen, The Interjurisdictional Effects of Growth Controls on Housing Prices, 30 J. L.
& ECON. 149 (1987).
66. Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning and the Exercise of Monopoly Power, 5 J. URB.
ECON. 116, 125-28 (1978).
67. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 8, at 4; Lillydahl & Singell, supra note 20, at
71; see also H.E. Frech, III & Ronald N. Lafferty, The Effect of the California Coastal
Commission on Housing Prices, 17 J. URB. ECON. 105 (1984); Katz & Rosen, supra
note 65, at 159; Henry 0. Pollakowski & Susan M. Wachter, The Effects of Land-Use
Constraints on Housing Prices, 66 LAND ECON. 315 (1990); Seymour I. Schwartz et al.,
The Effect of Growth Control on the Production of Moderate-Priced Housing, 60
LAND ECON. 110 (1984). Some have argued, in contrast, that the effect of growth
controls on the cost and supply of housing is negligible, and that national policies in
the areas of credit and taxation are far more important. See JOHN K. GILDERBLOOM
& RICHARD P. APPELBAUM, RETHINKING RENTAL HOUSING 123 (1988).
68. See generally Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic
and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385 (1977) (using economic theory to analyze
growth control controversy); GILDERBLOOM & APPELBAUM, supra note 67 (arguing
that local growth and environmental controls have very little impact on housing costs,
and that inflation rates and credit and taxation policies are much more important).
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Restrictions on the development of new housing are, of course,
only one factor in creating a shortage of affordable housing. The
number of people living in poverty-and therefore the amount
that people can afford for shelter-fluctuates significantly as eco-
nomic conditions change.69 For potential home buyers, the largest
single factor in housing affordability in recent years has been mort-
gage rates; the very high interest rates in the late 1970's put houses
out of reach for many households that can afford them with the
low rates of the early 1990's.7° Demographic trends, in particular
the demand for housing units created by the formation and dissolu-
tion of families, are also very important factors. 71 Labor and mate-
rial costs, which have almost nothing to do with local opposition,
account for about half of new housing costs. 72 Additionally, the
Reagan administration's massive cutbacks in federal housing subsi-
dies drastically reduced the creation of low-income housing.73
3. Social services clients
Finding sites with willing neighbors is a considerable problem for
agencies, whether governmental or nonprofit, seeking to create
shelters for homeless people74 or group homes for the mentally ill,
recovering addicts, AIDS patients, and others.75 A disproportion-
ate number of such people come from the lower socio-economic
strata.76
Community facilities such as group homes are an important part
of the deinstitutionalization process. They provide an essential
transition between confinement to an institution and total integra-
tion into society. They are also as close to a normal living situation
as some people can ever achieve. It is difficult to find statistics
quantifying the impact that NIMBY resistance has on the availabil-
69. Statistics on the number of people living in poverty are presented in Commit-
tee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., Over-
view of Entitlement Programs: 1992 Green Book, at 1274 (1992).
70. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 8, at 1-2.
71. See Nick Ravo, After a Decade of Decline, Homeownership is Rising, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 28, 1993, § 10, at 5.
72. Lillydahl & Singell, supra note 20, at 68.
73. STONE, supra note 56, at 158-62.
74. Joseph P. Griffith, For the Homeless, 'Nimby' on the Doormat, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 22, 1992, § 10, at 8.
75. Davan Maharaj, Center Unwanted Neighbor to Residents; Dispute: Garden
Grove Homeowners Want Facility for Mentally Ill to Move, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1993,
at Al; Gayle T. Williams, Group Homes: No Open Door, REPORTER DISPATCH
(White Plains, N.Y.), June 20, 1993, at 1.
76. Bruce P. Dohrenwend et al., Socioeconomic Status and Psychiatric Disorders.
The Causation-Selection Issue, 255 SCIENCE 946 (1992).
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ity or cost of group homes and other social service facilities. A
1983 study concluded that zoning and other land-use policies in
metropolitan areas generally were not major hindrances for most
sponsors of group homes.77 However, a 1985 survey of profes-
sional planners by the American Planning Association revealed a
concern that "overly restrictive zoning regulations" have been a
"major stumbling block to the deinstitutionalization movement. ' 78
The Mental Health Law Project has estimated that half the sites
chosen for group homes never open because of community
opposition.79
It is similarly difficult to find clear numbers on the adequacy of
existing facilities. A 1988 survey of twenty-seven cities concluded
that, on average, 19% of requests by homeless people for emer-
gency shelter went unmet.8 ° It would be useful to find statistics
concerning the availability of placements for patients who would
benefit from placement in group homes. One examination con-
cluded that there is a severe shortage of community mental health
facilities, and many patients are still confined to institutions as a
result, but that local opposition to new facilities is only one of the
numerous reasons for this shortage.81
B. Indirect Beneficiaries of Facilities
The above discussion concerned the direct users of facilities
whose construction is inhibited by local opposition. The facilities
also have indirect beneficiaries, as discussed in the following
section.
1. Residents of Areas with Substandard Waste Disposal
As stated previously, the United States has an adequate amount
of disposal capacity for most kinds of hazardous municipal and
medical waste. However, much of the waste is disposed in old fa-
cilities that operate under less regulation than is applicable to new
77. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PuB. No. GAO/HRD/83-14, AN ANALYSIS
OF ZONING AND OTHER PROBLEMS AFFECTING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GROUP
HOMES FOR THE MENTALLY DISABLED (1983).
78. Salsich, supra note 7, at 419 (citing AMERICAN PLANNING ASS'N, ZONING
NEWS (Jan. 1986)).
79. Ann Marie Rizzo et al., Strategies for Responding to Community Opposition in
an Existing Group Home, 15 PSYCHOSOCIAL REHAB. J. 85 (1992).
80. U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, supra note 61, at 50.
81. Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Community Mental Health Treatment for the Mentally
Ill-When Does Less Restrictive Treatment Become a Right?, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1971,
1972-74 (1992).
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units.82 Because it is so difficult to site new facilities, old units con-
tinue in operation. In fact, only one of the twenty-one commercial
hazardous waste landfills operating today is on a site selected since
the enactment of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) in 1976. EPA has concluded that about 70% of all land-
based hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities
would fail EPA's current siting criteria for protecting ground-
water.83 One sample found potential releases of hazardous wastes
from about 90% of such facilities.84 The most pronounced example
of facilities operating past retirement age is the storage of high-
level radioactive waste in large tanks at the DOE complexes in
Washington and South Carolina.
There is some evidence that older facilities for hazardous waste
treatment and disposal were disproportionately located in minority
communities, 5 though these statistics predated the closing of large
numbers of older facilities in the mid-1980s upon the expiration of
the "interim status" that had allowed them to remain open.86 An
up-to-date analysis of currently operating RCRA facilities would
be useful.
A disproportionate share of contaminated sites are located in
minority communities.87 There is an active debate over the origins
82. Far laxer regulatory standards apply to old hazardous waste landfills than to
new ones, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO/RCED-91-79, HAZ-
ARDOUS WASTE: LIMITED PROGRESS IN CLOSING AND CLEANING UP CONTAMI-
NATED FACILITIES 20 (1991); CHRISTOPHER HARRIS ET AL., HAZARDOUS WASTE:
CONFRONTING THE CHALLENGE 111-13 (1987), and to old incinerators than to new
ones, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO/RCED-92-21, HAZARD-
OUS WASTE: INCINERATOR OPERATING REGULATIONS AND RELATED AIR EMISSION
STANDARDS (1991).
83. Guidelines for Hazardous Waste Treatment Sites: Hearings Before Subcommit-
tee on Commerce, Transportation & Tourism of House Committee on Energy and
Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., at 32, 48 (1986) (statement of Marcia E. Williams,
Director, EPA Office of Solid Waste).
84. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO/RCED-91-79, HAZARDOUS
WASTE: LIMITED PROGRESS IN CLOSING AND CLEANING UP CONTAMINATED FACILI-
TIES 44 (1991).
85. COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, Toxic
WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES 13 (1987) [hereinafter UCC REPORT];
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO/RCED-83-168, SITING OF HAZARD-
OUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC
STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES (1983).
86. See Alex S. Karlin, Hazardous Waste Management, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 12, § 29.09[2].
87. UCC REPORT, supra note 85.
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of this disparity, and whether it was deliberate or not,8 8 but there is
little question that it exists.
2. Product and Electricity Consumers
The chemical industry is by far the largest generator of hazard-
ous waste, followed by primary and fabricated metals and petro-
leum refining.89 The chemical industry manufactures some
products that are sold directly to consumers (such as insect sprays,
home cleansers, plastic bags, and batteries), but most of its output
is sold to other manufacturers, which then create products through-
out the economy. The same pattern follows with the other large
hazardous waste generators. No systematic study has been pub-
lished looking at how much hazardous waste is created in the man-
ufacture of various consumer products, or at how disposal costs
have affected the prices of various goods and services. Such a
study would inform the question of how consumers are affected by
a shortage or surplus of hazardous waste disposal facilities. All
things being equal, additional capacity should lower the price of
disposal, and hence the price of goods and services; however, this
effect might be wiped out if new capacity allows for the closure of
older, substandard facilities, or if market factors prevent savings
from being passed along to consumers. Thus, though local opposi-
tion has undoubtedly held down the number of waste disposal fa-
cilities, the effect on consumers of waste-generating products is
unknown.
As seen above, a large portion of all radioactive waste is gener-
ated in the production of electricity by nuclear power plants.90 Dis-
posal costs are an element of electric rates. The electric utilities
(and hence their customers) now pay twice for the management of
spent nuclear fuel-they pay for the development of the Yucca
Mountain facility,9' and they pay for the storage of the fuel rods at
the power plants while Yucca Mountain is being prepared. The
88. See Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got To Do With It? Environmental Justice and
the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001 (1993) (offer-
ing alternative explanations for the disproportionate siting patterns); Richard J. Laza-
rus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice": The Distributional Effects of Environmental
Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787 (1993) (exploring theoretical reasons for distribu-
tional inequities).
89. OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, supra note 35, at 2,
226.
90. Most of the rest is generated in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
91. 42 U.S.C. § 10222 (1988).
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opening of the disposal facility would end this double expense. 92
The amount of savings that would be realized by electricity con-
sumers, however, is uncertain.
3. Residents of Areas with High Concentrations of Social Service
Clients
Neighborhoods in some cities have large numbers of people who
are homeless, mentally ill, or otherwise disadvantaged in a way that
other residents often find unappealing or threatening.93 Certain
heavily-used public facilities, such as bus terminals and train sta-
tions, also attract such populations. A greater supply of homes or
shelters for the homeless, and group homes or other facilities for
other social service clients, might reduce the number of these peo-
ple wandering the street or inhabiting public facilities. The effect
would be only partial, though, because many people eligible for
these services reject them.
4. Overburdened Families
Many people who might otherwise be homeless or institutional-
ized are kept off the street and out of institutions because of the
kindness (or at least the tolerance) of friends and relatives who
give them places to sleep in their own houses or apartments. 94 This
often leads to cramped, tense living situations, which might be
eased by a greater supply of affordable housing and of social ser-
vice facilities.
C. Providers and Funders of Facilities
1. Waste Disposal Services
Private companies own and operate virtually all of the hazardous
waste disposal facilities in the United States and are responsible for
the construction of new ones. Municipal solid waste disposal facili-
ties (mostly landfills and incinerators) are owned either by munici-
palities or by private companies, often under contract to one or
more municipalities. The planned radioactive waste disposal facili-
92. In 1993 the Secretary of Energy proposed to end this double payment, and to
aid utilities in the cost of spent fuel shortage. Matthew L. Wald, A New U.S. Stance
on Atomic Wastes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3,1993, at A27;
93. See Susan Chira, New York's Poorest Neighborhoods Bear the Brunt of Social
Programs, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1989, § 1, at 1; Sam Roberts, In My Backyard? Where
New York City Puts Its Problems, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1992, at 54.
94. Jan E. Mutchler & Lauren J. Krovo, Availability and Affordability: Household
Adaptation to a Housing Squeeze, 68 Soc. FORCES 241 (1989).
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ties would all be owned by the federal government, except for the
commercial low-level radioactive waste facilities, which are pri-
vately owned.
Many of the companies seeking to site new waste disposal facili-
ties have suffered large losses when their proposals were defeated
by local opposition.95 On the other hand, to the extent that these
difficulties have restrained the supply of disposal capacity, the
price of disposal has greatly increased, to the benefit of disposal
companies. The net effect of facility opposition on a particular
company depends on the individual company's success or failure in
siting new facilities, and on the profitability of its existing facilities.
2. Housing Developers and Builders
The people who develop and build housing (and their suppliers
and employees) are hurt if local opposition reduces (as opposed to
displaces) the construction of new housing. If some of the develop-
ers are also landlords of existing housing, they enjoy an offsetting
benefit if a shortage of housing allows them to charge higher rents.
It does not appear that the net effect of these conflicting influences
has been quantified in any published study.
3. Taxpayers
Only slight changes in personal circumstances and the availabil-
ity of different kinds of facilities determine Whether certain individ-
uals reside, at any given moment, in low-income housing, homeless
shelters, group homes, hospitals, or jails. For this population, all
these kinds of facilities are either provided or heavily subsidized by
the government, with some help (except for jails) from the charita-
ble sector, yet even that help receives a significant tax subsidy. The
cost of these facilities varies widely; hospital and jail beds, for ex-
ample, are much more expensive to provide than are affordable
housing units and group homes.96 Thus, taxpayers suffer if local
opposition moves more people toward more expensive rather than
less expensive government-funded lodging. Whether this actually
occurs, and if so to what extent, are unknown.
95. Clean Harbors of Braintree, Inc., spent $16 million on its unsuccessful effort to
site a hazardous waste incinerator in Massachusetts. DENNIS J. BRION, ESSENTIAL
INDUSTRY AND THE NIMBY PHENOMENON 13-14 (1991). CECOS International, Inc.
spent at least $7 million in a failed attempt to expand a hazardous waste facility in
Niagara Falls, New York. Paul MacClennan, The Stakes Are High in the CECOS
Hearings, BUFFALO NEWS, Sept. 18, 1988, at H16.
96. See Mandelker, supra note 30, at 147.
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D. Neighbors of Displaced Facilities
As noted at the beginning of this Essay, many commentators be-
lieve that NIMBY opposition hurts minority communities by dis-
placing undesirable facilities (especially landfills and incinerators)
from white areas, which have the resources to fight them, and mov-
ing them into minority areas, which do not.
Few concrete examples or statistics have been presented to es-
tablish that this sequence of events actually occurs. Upon closer
examination, it becomes clear that it does not occur, at least for
most types of waste streams.
1. Hazardous Waste
Only one new off-site hazardous waste landfill has opened on a
new site, and remained open, since the enactment of RCRA97 in
1976. It is in Last Chance, Colorado, an area where the population
is 87% white.98 There are a few new hazardous waste incinerators,
but it is not clear that they are primarily in minority communities.
2. Municipal Solid Waste (MSW)
Many new incinerators, and several new landfills, for MSW have
opened in the past two decades. Professor Bullard has demon-
strated that, in Houston in the 1970s, new MSW facilities were
overwhelmingly sited in minority communities.99 Scattered litiga-
tion has suggested similar patterns in a few other cities. 1°° No pub-
lished study has examined nationwide patterns in siting MSW
facilities. Regulations promulgated by EPA under RCRA in
1991,101 imposing strict design, construction, and siting standards
on new MSW landfills, are likely to lead to the construction of
97. 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1983).
98. The demographic figure is from the U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1990 CEN-
SUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING. See also Hunt v. Chemical Waste Management,
Inc., 584 So. 2d 1367, 1373 (Ala. 1991), rev'd 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992); NEW YORK STATE
DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ASSISTANCE TO LOCALI-
TIES AFFECTED By HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT FACILITIES 35-39 (Apr.
1988).
99. BULLARD, supra note 1, at 50-54. A detailed critique of Professor Bullard's
methodology is contained in Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority
Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.J. 1383
(1994).
100. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
101. 56 Fed. Reg. 50,978 (1991).
514
VICTIMS OF NIMBY
large landfills in relatively remote areas and to less use of small
landfills scattered throughout cities, as occurred in Houston. 10 2
3. Medical Waste
In a few well-known, highly controversial cases, new medical
waste incinerators have been sited in minority communities. °3
However, no published study has looked at nationwide patterns.
4. High-level Radioactive Waste
The U.S. Department of Energy is attempting to site the nation's
only repository for high-level radioactive waste in Yucca Mountain,
in an uninhabited area of the Nevada desert. Its nearest neighbor
is a legal brothel eighteen miles away."
5. Transuranic Waste
The nation's only repository for transuranic waste is in a rela-
tively uninhabited area near Carlsbad, New Mexico. As noted
above, this site is not yet open.
6. Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Efforts are underway in several states to site new LLRW land-
fills. These have focused on mostly white farming communities in
New York, Connecticut, Nebraska, and Illinois, as well as in the
California desert. There appear to have been no efforts to site new
LLRW facilities in minority communities. 10 5 In the past decade the
only successful siting of a new facility for radioactive waste-first
for mill tailings, then for LLRW-was in Tooele County, Utah. 0 6
Several new hazardous waste incinerators and other similar facili-
ties have been sited in Tooele County since the late 1980's.107 The
county is 91% white. 8
102. See Kirsten Engel, Environmental Standards as Regulatory Common Law: To-
ward Consistency in Solid Waste Regulation, 21 N.M. L. REV. 13 (1990); Kathleen
Farrelly, The New Federal Standards for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills: Adding Fuel
to the Regulatory Fire, 3 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 383 (1992).
103. See Ian Fisher, Builders and Foes Using Bronx Incinerator as Test, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 8, 1992, at B3; Frances F. Marcus, Medical Waste Divides Mississippi Cities, N.Y.
TIMES, June 24, 1992, at A16.
104. Fred C. Shapiro, Yucca Mountain, NEW YORKER, May 23, 1988, at 61.
105. See GERRARD, WHOSE BACKYARD, WHOSE RISK, supra note 9, ch. 3.
106. However, many other sites for the disposal of uranium mill tailings are located
near the mines in Navajo country.
107. Donovan Webster, Happiness is a Toxic Waste Zone, OUTSIDE, Sept. 1993, at
58.
108. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING.
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In sum, for those types of waste streams for which specific infor-
mation is available, there is no nationwide pattern since the enact-
ment of RCRA in 1976 of siting new hazardous or radioactive
waste disposal facilities in minority rather than white areas (largely
because so few new facilities have been sited in that period). Data
should be compiled to determine if any nationwide racial patterns
can be discerned in the siting of MSW and medical waste facilities.
Similarly, it would be useful to compile data on recent patterns and
siting sequences in the location of low-income housing and social
service facilities.
IV. The Beneficiaries of NIMBY
A. Owners of Existing Facilities
As noted in Part IV, owners of waste disposal facilities benefit
from opposition to new facilities if this allows them to charge more
for the services of their old facilities, or allows these old facilities to
remain open longer, and if these owners were not themselves try-
ing unsuccessfully at great expense to site new facilities. Both haz-
ardous and solid waste disposal are increasingly concentrated in a
small number of large nationwide companies, and thus the second
prong of this requirement may well not be satisfied.
Owners of existing housing are major beneficiaries of restrictions
on the construction of new housing. Housing shortages will in-
crease the value of existing housing and, if the units are rented and
there are no rent controls, will allow the owners to charge higher
rents. 0 9
Few social service facilities are operated for profit (except for
the occasional proprietary clinic serving affluent or amply insured
patients with addictive or other mental disorders), and thus local
opposition to new social service facilities will rarely increase the
profits of existing facilities.
B. Municipalities With Existing Facilities
In some states, municipalities are allowed to levy a gross receipts
tax or other charge on waste disposal facilities within their bor-
ders.110 These municipalities will benefit if those existing facilities
enjoy higher revenues as a result of restrictions on the construction
of competing facilities.
109. See Ellickson, supra note 68.
110. SHARON N. GREEN, PLANNING FOR HAZARDOUS WASTE CAPACITY: LESSONS
FROM THE NORTHEAST STATES 93 (1990).
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As just noted, owners of existing housing benefit from growth
restrictions. If that housing is in a jurisdiction neighboring the one
with the restrictions, the municipality with the existing housing
may well benefit from the ability to charge higher property taxes
for that housing.
C. Neighbors of Blocked Facilities
Communities that successfully block the siting of facilities they
do not want are, of course, the most visible beneficiaries of local
opposition. In the case of waste disposal facilities, these communi-
ties have avoided the health and environmental risks, and the
threatened loss in property values, tourism, and community image
that can accompany a disposal facility. These benefits are more
affected by distance from the facility than by municipal borders."1
The communities that exclude low-income housing and social
service facilities may preserve their property values, though the ev-
idence seems to show that social service facilities such as group
homes have little or no detrimental impact on neighboring prop-
erty values. 112 These communities also receive psychic gratifica-
tion, though sometimes based on racial animus or other impulses
that society as a whole regards as repugnant.
D. The Environment
The environment often benefits, both directly and indirectly,
from the successful blockage of waste disposal facilities. Sites are
protected from the long term environmental impacts of the new
facilities. A landfill is designed to contain waste forever, and
(notwithstanding magazine advertisements showing golf courses
111. See PANEL ON SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE
MANAGEMENT, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF
RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL: CONSIDERATIONS FOR INSTITUTIONAL MANAGE-
MENT 101-02 (1984) (discussing "distance-decay curves" in measuring the relationship
between distance and perceived impacts of radioactive waste disposal facilities). The
municipalities themselves also lose the compensation payments that are increasingly
offered for acceptance of such facilities, but by fighting the facility the municipalities
signal that freedom from a disposal facility is worth more to them than the offered
payments.
112. Been, supra note 88, at 1022-23 & nn.113-14; Katherine M. Boydell et al., The
Effect of Group Homes for the Mentally Ill on Residential Property Values, 40 HOSPI-
TAL & COMMUNITY PSYCH. 957 (1989). The available studies on this subject are com-
prehensively reviewed in COMMUNITY RESIDENCES INFORMATION SERVICES
PROGRAM, "THERE GOES THE NEIGHBORHOOD...": A SUMMARY OF STUDIES AD-
DRESSING THE MOST OFTEN EXPRESSED FEARS ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF GROUP
HOMES ON NEIGHBORHOODS IN WHICH THEY ARE PLACED (Oct. 1990).
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built atop closed landfills) the prospects for future beneficial uses
are speculative at best. Incinerators can theoretically be disman-
tled and any remaining contamination cleaned up, but there is little
actual experience here as well. The adverse environmental impacts
of a housing development or social service facility are of an entirely
different order of magnitude; they are no more harmful than any
other ordinary building, and unless they are proposed for a wetland
or other sensitive area, or are so large that they generate consider-
able traffic, the physical impacts are likely to be minimal.
The indirect environmental benefit from blocking waste disposal
facilities can be even more important. Professor Robert W. Lake
expressed this idea aptly:
Siting hazardous waste incinerators, 'for example, constitutes a
locational solution to an industrial production problem (hazard-
ous waste generation). But the incinerator siting solution is only
one of a number of possible strategies for hazardous waste man-
agement. The facility siting strategy concentrates costs on host
communities, as compared to the alternative strategy of restruc-
turing production so as to produce less waste, which in the short
run concentrates costs on capital. Locating homeless shelters
similarly concentrates costs on host communities, relative to an
alternative strategy that seeks to alleviate joblessness and re-
duce the incidence of poverty through capital restructuring."13
Michael R. Edelstein has gone even further:
In the absence of people having to come to grips with their own
waste problems, there is little pressure for them to conserve, re-
cycle, clean up, and reduce the waste flow. When wastes go
somewhere else, there is no impetus to be responsible for the
consequences of one's actions. This is a moral issue. Perhaps the
fallacious concepts of 'waste disposal' and YIYBY [Yes, in Your
Backyard] are really the problem, not NIMBY." 4
Though the phenomenon of homeless persons wandering the
streets has certainly increased public consciousness and increased
the public's willingness to pay for shelters, there is little evidence
that local opposition to homeless shelters has led to any significant
113. Robert W. Lake, Rethinking NIMBY, 59 AM. PLANNING Ass'N J. 87, 88
(1993); see also Robert W. Lake & L. Disch, Structural Constraints and Pluralist Con-
tradictions in Hazardous Waste Regulation, 24 ENV'T & PLANNING 663 (1992).
114. MICHAEL R. EDELSTEIN, CONTAMINATED COMMUNITIES: THE SOCIAL AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF RESIDENTIAL TOXIC EXPOSURE 187 (1988); see also,
Michael Heiman, From "Not in My Backyard!" to "Not in Anybody's Backyard!":
Grassroots Challenge to Hazardous Waste Facility Siting, 56 AM. PLANNING ASS'N J.
359 (1990).
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changes in the social and economic conditions that create home-
lessness. However, there is ample evidence that opposition to the
siting, expansion, or operation of waste disposal facilities has
helped spur a reevaluation in the way society creates and disposes
of waste. The author has been personally involved in several cases
where this has occurred:
.- the efforts by the City of New York to build an incinerator at
the Brooklyn Navy Yard to burn municipal solid waste have led
to stricter enforcement by the courts and the state environmen-
tal authorities of the City's obligations to increase its recycling
program;115
-New York State's efforts to site a landfill for disposing of low-
level radioactive waste led to such an uproar in the target com-
munities (farming areas in rural Cortland and Allegeny Coun-
ties) that the State Legislature amended state law to require a
reevaluation of disposal technology;" 6
-a private waste disposal company's proposal to build a mobile
hazardous waste incinerator to destroy waste from an upstate
Superfund site met resistance in the local community, leading
the company to explore alternative destruction technologies that
it ultimately found to be superior;
-restrictions on chemical discharges from a municipal waste-
water treatment plant led the local industries to install more so-
phisticated pollution control devices, thereby reducing the
chemicals they sent to the treatment plant;
-local resistance to the expansion of a hazardous waste landfill
induced the state to require the landfill's operators to provide
technical assistance in waste minimization to their customers.
When the disposal of waste becomes more expensive, economi-
cal alternatives are often discovered.117 Congress enacted the Pol-
115. In re SES Brooklyn Assocs., No. 20-85-0306, Fifth Interim Dec. (N.Y. Dep't
Envtl. Conservation, Sept. 9, 1993).
116. 1990 N.Y. LAWS ch. 913. This controversy also made its way to the United
States Supreme Court, which declared that the federal government, through its
threatened sanctions against states that failed to build LLRW facilities, was intruding
upon the states' rights under the Tenth Amendment. See New York v. United States,
112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
117. MARK H. DORFMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL DIVIDENDS: CUTTING MORE
CHEMICAL WASTES (1992); DAVID J. SAROKIN ET AL., CUTrING CHEMICAL WASTE:
WHAT 29 ORGANIC CHEMICAL PLANTS ARE DOING TO REDUCE HAZARDOUS
WASTES (1985); Ronald T. McHugh, The Economics of Waste Minimization, in HAZ-
ARDOUS WASTE MINIMIZATION 127 (Harry M. Freeman ed., 1990).
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lution Prevention Act of 1990 to explore more systematically the
ability of industries to reduce the waste they generate, rather than
simply to provide new disposal capacity.118
V. Secondary and Imponderable Effects
Local opposition to undesired facilities can also have effects that
are so indirect and hazy that one can only guess at their direction
and strength. However, since they are potentially significant, they
deserve brief mention.
A. Traffic
If affordable housing cannot be built near places of employment,
workers will have to commute longer distances, adding to traffic
congestion, energy consumption, and air pollution, and reducing
productivity. Restrictions on affordable housing in the suburbs
also presumably encourage conversion of agricultural land in the
exurban areas into housing. 1 9
B. Social Isolation
If members of minority groups are unable to find housing in
more affluent neighborhoods in the city or in the suburbs, they
may be more likely to remain in urban ghettos, where drug addic-
tion, violence, and other social as well as environmental ills are
heavily concentrated. 20
C. Community Organization
Opposition to a locally undesired facility is often a powerful im-
petus for neighbors to get to know each other, and to organize into
a cohesive community that will be better equipped to deal with its
other challenges.' 2'
118. 42 U.S.C. § 13101 (1993).
119. See Winston I. Smart, Economic and Financial Analysis of Alternative Uses of
Agricultural Land, 24 IND. L. REV. 1567 (1991).
120. For a discussion of the relationship of social conflict and environmental degra-
dation in the urban context, see Katrin Gillwald, Environmental Elasticity-Social
and Psychological Effects of Environmental Deterioration, in DISTRIBUTIONAL CON-
FLICTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL-RESOURCE POLICY 49 (Allan Schnaiberg et al. eds.,
1986).
121. See Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Equal Protection: The Need for
Environmental Poverty Law, 19 EcoLooY L.Q. 619 (1993).
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D. Transaction Costs
Siting controversies can be very costly and time-consuming for
all concerned. They require large amounts of energy and attention
of talented professionals (such as engineers, designers, managers,
and attorneys) on all sides of the battle-developers, opponents,
and regulators. Time spent waging such battles cannot be spent on
other, possibly more productive endeavors.
E. Opportunity Costs
Facility proponents can only concentrate on a limited number of
projects at once. If they fail after a long, costly effort to build a
facility in a particular location, they will often give up rather than
try again in a different place. Thus successful opposition efforts
often lead not to the relocation of proposed facilities, but to their
cancellation.
F. Public Consciousness
Fights over the location of low-income housing and social service
facilities may increase public consciousness of poverty and other
social ills that have made such facilities necessary, leading to
greater efforts to address the root causes of these problems. On
the other hand, it is equally plausible that these battles will spur
greater racial tensions and reduce ratherthan increase cooperative
efforts. By the same token, fights over the siting of waste disposal
facilities can increase public consciousness of environmental perils,
but they can also spark a public backlash against environmental
regulation.
VI. Conclusion
This Essay has demonstrated that local opposition has numerous
and complex impacts, which vary considerably depending on the
nature of the facility that is opposed. Opposition to waste disposal
facilities has not generally increased the siting of new landfills and
incinerators in minority communities, but it has perpetuated the
existence of old, substandard disposal units in those communities.
It has also spurred efforts to recycle and to reduce the creation of
waste, and thus may have a long-term positive effect on the
environment.
Opposition to low-income housing enriches homeowners and
landlords but makes affordable dwellings accessible to fewer and
fewer people. Opposition to social service facilities increases the
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cost of effectively helping people with certain physical and psycho-
logical disorders, and thus reduces society's ability to provide such
help.
All forms of local opposition are often lumped together under
the pejorative and trivializing label NIMBY. There is a key differ-
ence, however, between opposition to waste disposal facilities on
the one hand, and to low-income housing and social service facili-
tiesli on the other hand. Battles against waste disposal facilities
often have significantly positive environmental impacts, not only
for the particular sites, but for society at large, because they spur
sounder, less wasteful modes of production. In contrast, opposi-
tion to housing and social-service facilities has overwhelmingly
negative consequences for society. It is perhaps no accident that
existing regulatory structures make it considerably easier for a
community to wage a successful legal battle against a waste dispo-
sal facility than against a housing or social service facility.
This is not to say that there is no risk that minority communities
will suffer from affluent communities' battles against waste dispo-
sal units. It remains possible, though unproven, that these battles
could move some facilities to minority communities. The best pro-
tection against this danger is not to stop the game, but to level the
playing field. Minority communities should be given the technical
and legal resources they need to participate in crucial siting deci-
sions. That way they can make informed decisions about whether
they want particular waste disposal facilities in their midst, and if
the answer is no, they can take concrete steps to fight back. If
these battles lead the communities to become better organized,
then over time local residents may also become effective players in
the political as well as the legal battlefields.
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